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Abstract
Managers are risk averse. Excessive risk-aversion can destroy share-
holder wealth. A key source of risk is the threat of an opportunistic
takeover designed to take advantage of depressed market prices. This
is especially the case in innovative or hard-to-value (‘HtV’) companies
whose price may be depressed due to valuation difficulties rather than
managerial under-performance. For these HtV firms, the threat of an
opportunistic takeover can destroy value by inducing agency conflicts of
managerial risk aversion. managers and regulators argue that ATPs can
ameliorate this problem. This article presents a theoretical model and em-
pirical results that show that for HtV firms, ATPs encourage managers
to make value-creating takeovers and increase innovation and do not in-
duce agency conflicts of managerial entrenchment. This implies that for
innovative or hard-to-value firms, ATPs can ameliorate managerial risk
aversion and encourage value-creation.
Keywords: Takeovers, Acquisitions, Valuation, Governance, Managerial
Risk Aversion, Innovation
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1 Introduction
This article examines the use of anti-takeover provisions to reduce
agency conflicts of managerial risk aversion. Legislatures have al-
lowed ATPs. One reason might be that there is a ‘race to the bot-
tom’ to provide the most manager-friendly laws (Bebchuk, 1992;
Bebchuk and Ferrell, 1999). However, the race-to-the bottom the-
ory lacks universal support (for example Kahan and Kamar, 2002).
Instead, some legal commentators argue that a public-minded legis-
lature has allowed ATPs so that hard to value and innovative targets
can resist opportunistic takeovers and focus on long term strate-
gic objectives (following Ribstein, 1989; Henry, 1999; Hamermesh,
2006). This article tests whether ATPs achieve this public-minded
policy goal by testing whether ATPs encourage takeovers that create
value and increase innovation. To my knowledge, it is the first paper
to do so. This result is robust to endogeneity concerns inherent in
governance studies.
One source of agency conflict between shareholders and managers
is excess risk aversion (Amihud and Lev, 1981; May, 1995; Wiseman
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The market for corporate control is one
source of risk for managers. However, ATPs can insulate managers
from the market for corporate control (Daines and Klausner, 2001;
Casares and Karpoff, 2002). Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) suggest that this may enable
managers to act on agency conflicts and make unprofitable invest-
ments. However, other evidence indicates that this entrenchment
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effect may concentrate in specific industries (Johnson, Moorman,
and Sorescu, 2009), or in firms that have high latent agency conflicts
(Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2010). The ‘risk-aversion-
reduction’ hypothesis, is that for HtV firms, whose stock price might
be depressed by valuation risk, some insulation from market-forces
may enable managers to take a long-term outlook; and thus, may
encourage long-term value creation (following Gibbons and Murphy,
1992). This paper examines this hypothesis and finds evidence that
ATPs can help to align shareholder and manager incentives in HtV
firms by ameliorating managerial risk-aversion.
Some literature indicates that firms with more ATPs have lower
firm-value or may make worse takeover decisions. Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003) examine an index of 24 entrenchment and anti-
takeover provisions. They find that this index is negatively corre-
lated with firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q. Bebchuk and Cohen
(2005) argue that the presence of a classified board is the most im-
portant entrenchment mechanism. Subsequently Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferrell (2008) examine an index of six key ATPs.1 They find
that these six key-provisions drive the finding in Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003). Further, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find
that the market reacts negatively to acquisitions by firms with more
ATPs.
Recent evidence suggests that ATPs may not destroy value, and
suggests several alternative hypotheses. First, Lehn, Patro, and
1These are the presence of classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limits on
amendments to by-laws, limits on amendments to the firm’s charter, and super-majority
requirements for approval of a takeover bid.
3
Zhao (2007) find that ATPs do not cause lower market values. Sec-
ond, Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009) suggest any negative
relation between firm value and ATPs is merely an industry-effect.
That is, it merely reflects the fact that industries that have more
ATPs have lower firm value on average. Third, some evidence sug-
gests that ATPs may improve firm-value for some firms. Frakes
(2007) uses quantile regressions to examine the relation between
ATPs and firm-value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q. Frakes (2007) finds
ATPs reduce firm-value only if the firm is an ex-ante high-value
firm. If the firm is ex-ante low-value, then ATPs increase firm value.
This suggests that ATPs may actually encourage low value firms to
improve their performance. Frakes (2007) suggests that this may
be because ATPs enable managers to take a long-term approach
to investment-decisions. Frakes (2007) does not test this hypothe-
sis. Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) find similar evidence,
but indicate that the level of industry concentration determines the
valuation-effect of ATPs, and that ATPs influence firm value only
for firms in concentrated industries.
One reason for the inconsistent results may be that ATPs increase
value by ameliorating agency conflicts of managerial risk aversion.
Prior literature suggests that risky cash-flows may induce manage-
rial short-termism, particularly in hard to value companies.
The rationale proceeds in five steps. First, if cash flows are risky,
then assets are harder to value; and thus, (a) prices will be lower
on average (Park and Park, 2004), (b) investors will be less willing
to take large investment-positions (Summers, 1986), and (c) prices
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will be more volatile (Irvine and Pontiff, 2009; Campbell, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho, 2010). Second, if prices are lower, then then the firm
is exposed to ‘opportunistic’ takeovers, which occur when a bidder
believes that the target is ‘low-priced’ (see for example Hasbrouk,
1985; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997). Third, managers typically lose
their jobs after such hostile takeovers (Martin and McConnell, 1991;
Franks and Mayer, 1996). Thus, fourth, managers could take steps
to reduce risky cash flows by focusing on short-term, ‘safe’, projects,
which might not maximize firm value (Stein, 1988). Therefore, fifth,
ATPs, which managers believe will insulate them from takeovers
(consistent with Daines and Klausner, 2001; Casares and Karpoff,
2002), should reduce managerial risk aversion. Fortunately for the
firm’s shareholders, this only requires managers to be insulated from
opportunistic takeovers, not from disciplinary takeovers following
agency-motivated investments. Further, it only requires managers
to ‘believe’ that ATPs protect them from takeovers; ATPs need not
do so in reality.
There is some evidence that ATPs may spur innovation and
increase value. Atanassov (2009) suggests that state-based anti-
takeover laws may encourage greater innovation, as proxied by the
adoption of R&D patents. Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian
(2009) find a U-shaped relation between external and internal gover-
nance measures, and the level of innovation. However, these papers
do not indicate if patents increase value. Chemmanur and Tian
(2010) show that ATPs may increase the use of patents and that
this may increase firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q. However, To-
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bin’s Q is a messy proxy for firm value for two reasons. First, there is
endogeneity between ATPs and Tobin’s Q. Thus, Core, Guay, and
Rusticus (2006) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) show
that it may be that poor management may drives adoption of ATPs
rather than adoption of ATPs drives poor management. Second,
there is evidence that Tobin’s Q can deviate for long-periods from
accounting-measures of firm-value (see Frankel and Lee, 1998; Lee,
Myers, and Swaminathan, 1999; Curtis and Fargher, 2003). Third,
many firms have had ATPs since inception (Daines and Klausner,
2001); and thus, the presence of ATPs conveys no ‘new’ news to the
market without a new event. Therefore, in an efficient market, poor
governance in general, and ATPs in specific, should not influence
long-term performance. Further, the focus on patents, means that
it is difficult to generalize the results to firms that use few patents,
but are nevertheless hard to value.
The prior literature motivates re-examination of the use of ATPs
to generate value. The analysis starts with a theoretical model that.
It shows that ATPs can generate value by reducing agency conflicts
of managerial risk aversion. This simple model provides an intu-
itive relation between valuation risk and ATPs, and motivates the
empirical analysis.
The empirical analysis examines whether ATPs do create value
in HtV firms. Unlike prior literature that has examined ATPs and
innovation, which has focused on measures of long-term value, this
paper focuses on a single ‘event’ - a corporate acquisition. Focus-
ing on an event is important since an event involves the release of
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new news about which ATPs may convey information. The study
examines five types of hard to value (HtV) firms.2
The study posits that ATPs create value in HtV firms only if five
conditions hold: (1) The market reacts more positively to invest-
ments (takeovers) made by HtV firms that have more ATPs. (2)
These acquisitions generate long term value. (3) The acquisitions
are more likely to induce value-creating innovation. (4) ATPs must
insulate managers from opportunistic takeovers without shielding
them from disciplinary ones. (5) ATPs must still not induce com-
placency and overpayment. The empirical results support all five
conditions, implying that ATPs do encourage value-creation in HtV
firms. These results are robust to endogeneity and econometric is-
sues.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it
contributes to the literature on managerial incentives and innova-
tion. Prior literature shows that risk-aversion is a source of agency
conflicts between shareholders and managers and this might induce
value-destroying decisions (Amihud and Lev, 1981; May, 1995; Wise-
man and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Carpenter, 2000). This paper suggests
that firms might use ATPs to resolve this conflict.
Second, it contributes to the literature on anti-takeover pro-
visions. Some literature indicates that ATPs may reduce value
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). But, Johnson, Moorman, and
2These are: (1) high-tech software firms, which are typically difficult to value (Park and
Park, 2004); (2) medical companies, which typically rely on hard to value research and devel-
opment; (3) firms with a high average per-period analyst forecast dispersion, (4) firms with a
high yearly standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts, and (5) firms that have a high
analyst forecast error.
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Sorescu (2009) indicate that this is industry-specific, and Harford,
Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2010) indicate that it is highest for
firms that have agency conflicts of over-valued equity. Thus, ATPs
may not reduce value for all types of firms. Chemmanur and Tian
(2010) suggest that hard to value firms are one type of firm for which
ATPs may generate value. However, due to the focus on proxies for
long-term value and on the use of patents, the conclusion is unclear.
Thus, this paper shows ATPs can help hard to value firms to cre-
ate value. The finding that ATPs may benefit some types of firm
suggests that future literature could examine the types of firm for
which ATPs destroy value.
Third, a collateral finding is to show that the relation between
ATPs and value-creation/destruction is robust to endogeneity. The
results, and robustness tests, indicate that (1) ATPs do entrench
some firms (but do not effectively entrench HtV firms), and (2) the
relation between ATPs and takeover returns is robust to endogeneity
concerns.
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains
a theoretical model that demonstrates how ATPs can increase share-
holder wealth. Section 3 presents the empirical framework in order
to structure the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 contains the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes




There are three relevant players: (a) the manager or CEO, (b) the
‘firm’, and (c) a ‘shark’. The manager wishes to maximize his or
her utility by altering the firm’s asset mix. The shark wishes to
acquire a low priced firm and replace incumbent management. The
firm wishes to maximize its risk adjusted profit.
The situation proceeds as follows. First, the firm sets the level
of anti-takeover provisions, A and hires a manager. Assume that
the level of anti-takeover protection is a continuous variable. That
is, it represents the overall ‘strength’ of protection. Further, the set
of ATPs does not include becoming a ‘dual class’ company since
this might create a disconnect between voting rights and cash flow
rights, which might encourage managerial rent extraction (Masulis,
Wang, and Xie, 2008). This paper is not a contract-theory paper
and does not consider the optimal contract between the firm and the
manager. The compensation contract contains a fixed component,
k, and an incentive component that is a monotonically increasing
function, g(·), of the end-of-period value.
Second, the manager invests in a set of ‘divisions’ or ‘assets’.
The manager sets the amount of money invested. This is not an
either-or decision. The intuition is that firms routinely determine
the amount of resources to allocate to a division (as opposed to
whether to allocate money at all). The manager invests across n
assets. The vector of investments is x = (x1, . . . , xn). Each invest-
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ment has a random return, contained in the random return vector
r = (r1, . . . , rn). However, the manager knows that there may be
some estimation error in the random return vector. Thus, due to the
estimation error, the random returns lie between the lower bound
r and the upper bound r̄. Thus, r ≤ r ≤ r̄. The expected return
vector is is y = E (r), which similarly lies between y and ȳ.
The returns are joint-normally distributed with variance-covariance
matrix Σ and probability density function denoted p(r). Thus, the
total variance is xTΣx. However, as with the random returns, there
is measurement error in the estimation of Σ. Thus, Σ lies between
the lower bound Σ and the upper bound Σ̄. This induces the un-
certainty sets:
R = {r ≤ r ≤ r̄}
Y =
{




Σ ≤ Σ ≤ Σ̄
}
Third, the market perceives the returns on these investments and
interprets the return as a signal of the manager’s quality. Note that
this is an imperfect signal and returns can be low because either
(a) the manager is low quality, or (b) the firm is hard to value or
in an innovative industry (such as technology). The market cannot
distinguish between these possibilities.
Fourth, the shark decides if it will acquire the firm. It does
this only if the final value, xTy, is below a threshold level. The
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threshold level is a decreasing function of the level of ATPs. This
reflects the fact that ATPs make an acquisition more expensive. If
the acquisition is more expensive, then the firm must be cheaper for
the acquisition to be worthwhile. It is denoted η(A), with derivative
η′(A) < 0.
The firm’s situation is as follows. The firm decides on a level of
anti-takeover provisions, A. Further, it offers the manager a con-
tract. The fixed compensation is k. The incentive compensation
increases in the final asset value but does so at a decreasing rate.
That is g′(xT r) > 0 and g′′(xT r) < 0, where xT r is the final return,
g′ is the first-derivative, and g′′ is the second derivative. Thus, total
wage is w = k + g(xT r). The firm is risk-neutral. This reflects the
fact that shareholders can reduce their risk exposure by dividing
their wealth between the risk free asset and the risky firm. Thus,
the firm’s goal is to chose the level of ATPs in order to maximize
the end of period value. Following Tütüncü and Koenig (2004), this











The shark’s situation is as follows. The shark wishes to acquire
low-priced firms and to replace (supposedly) inefficient managers.
This correlates with the idea of acquiring firms that have a low
Tobin’s Q (see Hasbrouk, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997). The
11
shark acquires the firm if its value, xT r, is below the threshold η(A).
However, ATPs make the takeover expensive. Thus, η decreases
with the level of ATPs (i.e. if there are more ATPs, then the firm’s
price must be lower).
The manager’s situation is as follows. The manager wishes to
maximize his/her utility. The manager is risk averse with utility
function Um such that U
′
m > 0 and U
′′
m < 0. The utility increases











. Since k is a constant, the manager
maximizes his/her utility by altering the firm’s asset mix. Thus, the







Two points are notable. First, the manager’s utility does not
explicitly increase with firm size (cf Nikolov and Whited, 2010).
Modeling firm size does not qualitatively change the solution since













monotonically increase with x. Sec-
ond, the model does not explicitly model managerial expropriation
since (a) expropriating assets (which increases managerial utility)
reduces returns by a commensurate amount (which reduces utility),
(b) Nikolov and Whited (2010) find that that the extent of manage-
rial expropriation is relatively small compared with the size of the
firm, (c) the wage function captures the use of perquisites for com-
pensation purposes,3 (as opposed to illegal theft purposes) and (d)
the model does not delve into strictly illegal ‘theft’ type behavior.
The manager also wishes to avoid losing his/her job. Thus, the
3Perquisites are often incorporated into wage contracts as ‘fringe benefits’ (see for example
Mitchell, 1983; Woodbury, 1983; Cheng, 2004).
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manager wants to ensure that with probability 1−α, the final return,
xTy, exceeds the shark’s takeover threshold η(A). That is there is
only a α% chance that xTy < η. Assume that the manager must
invest all cash available for investment, such that 1Tx = xT1 = 1.4
Thus, the manager’s optimization problem, consistent with Tütüncü





















xT rp(r)dr ≥ η(A)
}
(4)
xT1 = 1 (5)
The goal is then to (a) solve the manager’s optimization prob-
lem to obtain an optimal portfolio, x∗, as a function of the level of
ATPs, A, and the standard deviation of returns, Σ; and thus, (b)
to examine the relation between firm-risk (Σ), ATPs (A), and the
firm’s return.
2.2 Solution
The solution proceeds as follows. There are two issues (a) what is
the manager’s optimal portfolio vector, x, and (b) given this optimal
portfolio, how does the interaction of variance and ATPs influence
the portfolio return. It is convenient to break this into several sub-
steps.
4Nikolov and Whited (2010) show that the manager need not invest all cash. However,
relaxing this constraint does not qualitatively change the solution obtained in Proposition 2.1
or in Proposition 2.2.
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Proposition 2.1 (Optimal Portfolio) If (a) the vector of returns
is normally distributed, with mean return y, and variance Σ, (b) the
takeover threshold is η(A), and (c) the z-statistic associated with





2η(A)y − yλ−11 − (λ2/λ1)1
)
Here, y is the vector of returns, η(A) is the takeover threshold at
which the shark acquires the firm, zA is the z-statistic associated with
η(A), Σ is the variance-covariance matrix, and λ1, λ2 are Lagrange
multipliers.
Proof 1 The Proof is in the Appendix
The Second key issue is how the firm’s returns change based upon
interaction of (a) return variance, and (b) ATPs. Proposition 2.2
summarizes the result.
Proposition 2.2 The firm’s total returns increase with the inter-
action of ATPs and return-variance. That is, if the asset returns
are more risky, then returns increase with ATPs.
Proof 2 The Proof is in the appendix
To summarize findings thus far, risky firms (interchangeably called
difficult-to-value or hard to value firms) benefit by giving managers
more ATPs. Conversely, stable firms, as proxied by low cash flow
volatility, do not benefit by giving managers more ATPs. The issue
is then whether the empirical evidence supports this prediction.
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3 Empirical Framework
This section details the empirical setting. The over-arching theory is
that ATPs enable managers of HtV firms to generate value by ame-
liorating agency conflicts of managerial risk aversion. This implies
that ATPs enable HtV acquirers to make innovative investments
that increase shareholder wealth.
The theory that ATPs faciliate value-creation and innovation in
HtV firms holds only if the following conditions obtain: (1) the
market reacts more positively to investments (takeovers) made by
HtV firms that have more ATPs. (2) these acquisitions generate
long term value. (3) the acquisitions induce value-creating innova-
tion. (4) ATPs must insulate managers from opportunistic takeovers
without shielding them from disciplinary ones. (5) ATPs must still
not induce complacency and overpayment. All must hold after con-
trolling for relevant control variables. This section details the pre-
dictions. Section 4 defines the relevant variables.
First, the market must react positively to the investments (as
proxied by takeovers) made by HtV acquirers. The prediction is a
positive coefficient on HtV × ATPs in Equation (6).
Reaction = f(HtV,ATPs,HTV × ATPs,Controls) (6)
Second, these acquisitions must improve long-term value. The
market’s reaction to an event is a good proxy for whether it will
create value. However, if valuation-difficulties arise, then the market
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might mis value investments over short time-horizons (Wooldridge,
1988; Porter, 1992; Hall, 1993). Thus, Powell and Stark (2003)
suggest that it is important to examine long-term value-creation.
This implies a positive coefficient on HTV × ATPs in Equation (7).
Valuet+i = f(Valuet−1,HtV,ATPs,HTV × ATPs,Controls) (7)
Third, ATPs should encourage HtV firms to make takeovers that
both (a) increase innovation and (b) create value, as proxied by a
positive market-reaction to the takeover announcement. This im-
plies a positive coefficient on HTV × ATPs in Equation (8).
 Higher Innovation
×Reaction > 0
 = f(HtV,ATPs,HTV × ATPs,Controls)
(8)
Fourth, the hypothesis is that ATPs shield managers of HtV com-
panies from opportunistic takeovers but do not prevent disciplinary
takeovers. This is important because disciplinary takeovers are a key
mechanism to remove managers who make value-destroying invest-
ments (Scharfstein, 1988; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Kini, Kracaw,
and Mian, 2004; Offenberg, 2009). To assess this, the dependent
variable is ‘Acquired’, an indicator that equals one if the firm is
taken over within 4 years of the initial acquisition (following Of-
fenberg, 2009). The key independent variables are ‘HtV’, ‘HtV ×
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ATPs’, ‘HtV × Reaction< 0’, and ‘HtV × ATPs × Reaction< 0’.
This induces Equation (9).
Acquired = f (HtV,HtV × ATPs,HtV × Reaction< 0,
HtV × ATPs × Reaction< 0,Controls)
(9)
The predictions are (1) ATPs do not insulate HtV firms from
disciplinary takeovers following a value destroying acquisition. This
holds if there is a positive coefficient on ‘HtV × ATPs × Reaction<
0’. (2) ATPs do protect HtV firms from opportunistic takeovers
unrelated to making a value-destroying acquisition. This holds if
there is a negative coefficient on ‘ATPs × HtV’.
Fifth, the ATPs must not make the HtV firm’s managers compla-
cent and must not induce overpayment. Higher takeover premiums
can indicate overpayment. However, they can also indicate the need
to pay a high price for a high-synergy target. Overpayment reduces
shareholder wealth; synergies increase it. Thus, a negative market-
reaction to the takeover premium implies overpayment whereas a
positive market-reaction to the takeover premium is consistent with
synergies. Thus, if ATPs create value in HtV firms then there should
be a positive coefficient on HtV×Proxy Premium×ATPs in Equa-
tion (10).
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Reaction = f(HtV,ATPs,Proxy Premium,
HtV× Proxy Premium,ATPs× Proxy Premium,
HtV× Proxy Premium× ATPs,Controls)
(10)
4 Sample and Variables
This sample comprises 3935 acquisitions by companies listed in the
US and made between 1990-2005. The takeover must be announced
before 2005 so that it is possible to examine whether an acquirer is
targeted for a takeover within four years of the initial acquisition.
Acquisition data comes from SDC platinum. Stock price data is from
CRSP. Firm-level data is from Compustat. IBES analyst forecasts
are from the IBES database on WRDS. Governance data is from
RiskMetrics (formerly, IRRC).5 Consistent with Masulis, Wang, and
Xie (2007), the sample only comprises completed acquisitions where
the acquirer controls 100% of the target after the acquisition, and
for which the bidder and target have the necessary data. The sample
excludes companies with dual class shares (consistent with Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). The sample
yields the following variables, which Table 1 defines.
5IRRC only reports data for every second or third year during the sample-period. For years
with missing data, the article backfills data from the previously available year. The results
are robust to forward filling with data from the next available year.
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4.1 Proxies for Hard to Value Companies
The study uses five proxies for HtV firms are (a) Software, a dummy
that equals one if the firm is in the software industry,6 (b) Medical,
a dummy that equals one if the firm is in the medical industry,7
(c) HighDispersion, a dummy that equals one if the firm’s yearly
average analyst forecast dispersion is in the top 25% of the IBES
population, (d) HighVariability, a dummy that equals one if the
standard deviation of analyst forecast errors is in the top 25% of the
IBES population for that year, and (e) HighError, a dummy that
equals one if the firm’s analyst forecast error is in the top 25% of
the IBES population for that year, implying some difficulty valuing
the company.
4.2 The ATP variables
The paper examines several measures of the level of anti-takeover
provisions. The main measure, and the one that features in the
reported multivariate tests, is ‘GIM≥ 10’, a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the firm has a Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index
above 10 (following Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2010).8
6Following Loughran and Ritter (2002), these have the 4-digit SIC codes: 7371, 7372, 7373,
7374, 7375, 7378, 7379.
7Loughran and Ritter (2004) define these as firms with 4-digit SIC code of 3841 or 3845.
The paper extends this to include firms as being classified as as optical (SIC code 3827),
surgical (SIC code 3841), orthopedic (SIC code 3842), dental (SIC code 3843), electromedical
(SIC code 3845), opthalmic (SIC code 3851), or pharmaceutical (SIC code 2834).
8The results hold using other measures of anti-takeover provisions, including the Gom-
pers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index, the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) six-provision
entrenchment index, and a dummy that equals one if the firm has a classified board.
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4.3 Takeover Premiums
The takeover premium is the transaction value divided by the tar-
get’s share price 3, 11, or 21 days before the acquisition. However,
the premium paid for a transaction is endogenous with the market’s
reaction to that transaction. Thus, follwoing Officer (2007) and
Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2010), the study examines
a ‘Proxy Premium’, defined as the average takeover premium paid
for companies in the target’s industry in the year of the acquisi-
tion. A collateral advantage is that this allows the sample to retain
acquisitions of unlisted targets.
4.4 Dependent Variables
4.4.1 Reaction Variable
This proxy for the market’s reaction is the firm’s cumulative average
abnormal return (‘CAR’) surrounding the takeover announcement.
The CAR is the sum of a firm’s abnormal stock returns around the
announcement date. The study calculates abnormal returns using
an OLS estimation of the market model estimated over the period
11-days to 210-days before the acquisition announcement. Follow-
ing Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), the main estimation cumulates
abnormal returns from day -2 to day +2 (a five-day event window).
4.4.2 Long Term Performance Variable
The proxy for the bidder’s long-term value is its industry adjusted
Tobin’s Q (‘IaTobinQ’). ‘IaTobinQ’ is the firm’s Tobin’s Q less the
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average Tobin’s Q in the firm’s 3-digit SIC industry.9 The rationale
is that Tobin’s Q is a commonly used measure of value (see Lang,
Stulz, and Walkling, 1989; Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski,
1999; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). However, Tobin’s Q is
naturally higher for some industries; and thus, a high Tobin’s Q in
a high-tech firm might give the false impression of high performance
(following Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman, 2005). Thus, the
study subtracts the average Tobin’s Q for the firm’s 3-digit SIC in-
dustry from the firm’s Tobin’s Q (consistent with Powell and Stark,
2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2008).10
4.4.3 Value Creating Innovation
The ‘value creating innovation’ variables equal one if the takeover in-
creases ‘innovation’ and the market reacts positively to the takeover.
The study uses two proxies for innovation-increasing takeovers.
First, acquisitions of targets in high-tech industries might encour-
age further innovation. Thus, ‘TargetTech’ equals one if the tar-
get is in a high-tech industry, as defined in Loughran and Ritter
(2002). Second, it examines the post-takeover increase in R&D.11
An increase in R&D signals a long-term commitment to innova-
tion since R&D generates long-term (rather than immediate) cash
flows (Hagedoorn, 1989), and correlates with an increase in patents
(Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim,
9The results are robust to subtracting the industry medial Tobin’s Q and examining SIC
2-digit and SIC 3-digit industry classifications.
10The results are robust to the industry-adjustment procedure, also holding when subtract-
ing industry-medians, and when defining industry using 2-digit and 4-digit SIC codes.
11R&D expenditures have received substantial use as a proxy for innovation, see: Hagedoorn
(2002); Desyllas and Hughes (2010); Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006); Cloodt, Hagedoorn,
and Van Kranenburg (2006); Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003).
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1997). Thus, the study deems an acquisition to increase innovation
if R&Dt+i > R&Dt−1, where i ∈ {1, 2}.
The study captures whether the innovation creates value by in-
teracting the innovation variable with an indicator that equals one
if the market reacts positively to the acquisition announcement.
Thus, the two ‘value creating innovation’ variables are I(R&Dt+i >
R&Dt−1)× CAR > 0 and TargetTech× CAR > 0.
4.4.4 Post-takeover Disciplinary takeovers
Entrenchment arises if ATPs protect managers from disciplinary
takeovers (a takeover following a value-decreasing acquisition). Of-
fenberg (2009) suggests that a way to check for entrenchment is
to assess whether a bidder receives an acquisition attempt in the
4-years after the initial acquisition. Thus, the study examines the
likelihood of receiving a takeover bid within 4 years of the initial
acquisition.
4.5 Control Variables
The control variables are standard in the literature.12 The variables
are in two sub-categories: bidder-based variables and deal-based
variables. Table 1 describes the variables in detail. The following
describes the variables in the ‘Reaction’ model in brief.
The bidder variables are: (1) ‘LnAssets’: the natural log of
the bidder’s book assets; (2) ‘P/RIV’: the price-to-residual-income-
value; (3) ‘FCF/MVA’: the free cash flow scaled by the market value
12See for example: Moeller and Schlingemann (2005); Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz
(2004, 2005); Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007).
22
of assets; (4) ‘Leverage’: the long-term debt divided by the market
value of assets; and (5) ‘TobinQ’: the Tobin’s Q defined as the mar-
ket value of assets divided by the book value of assets.
The deal-based variables are: (1) ‘RunUp’: the pre-announcement
run-up; (2) ‘Volume’: the pre-announcement abnormal stock turnover;
(3) ‘RelSize’: the transaction value divided by the bidder’s market
value; (4) ‘BothTech’: an indicator that both the bidder and tar-
get are high-tech as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2002).13; (6)
‘BothTech’ × ‘RelSize’; (7) ‘Diversifying’: an indicator that the
bidder and target are in different Fama-French 48 industries; (8)
‘CrossBorder’: an indicator that the bidder and target are based
in different countries; (9) ‘Competed’: an indicator that there were
multiple bidders; (10) the indicators ‘Public’, ‘Private’, ‘Subsidiary’
represent an acquisition of a listed target, an unlisted target, a sub-
sidiary. The terms ‘Cash’ and ‘Stock’ equal one if the bidder paid
with some cash, or with only stock, respectively. The models control
for the interactions of the variables.
The models in Equations (7), (8), and (9) use slightly differ-
ent sets of variables. Equation (7) discards some deal-variables
that should not logically influence long-term value, and includes
‘IaTobinQt−1’ in place of TobinQt−1. Equation (8) omits ‘BothTech’
and ‘Tech×RelSize’ to avoid endogeneity. Equation (9) controls for
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘HHI’) due to the relationship be-
13They define high tech firms as firms in the industries: computer hardware (SIC codes:
3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578); communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669); electronics
(3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); measuring and
controlling devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829); medical instruments (3841, 3845); telephone
equipment (4812, 4813); communications services (4899); and software (7371, 7372, 7373,
7374, 7375, 7378, 7379).
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tween industry concentration and takeover prediction.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Sample Description and Univariate Analysis
The sample contains 3935 acquisitions. Table 2 contains the sample
description by year. Software companies make 408 of these acquisi-
tions and Medical companies make 164 acquisitions in the sample.
The sample reveals some takeover clustering. Specifically, there are
relatively few takeovers in 1990 and 1991. However, 1998 and 1999
feature a significant spike in takeover activity.
Table 3 contains summary statistics. Column 1 contains statis-
tics for the full sample of 3935 firms. The statistics are largely in
line with those reported in prior literature (see Moeller, Schlinge-
mann, and Stulz, 2004; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). Columns
2-6 contain summary statistics for sub-samples of HtV firms. There
is significant variation in the variables across the HtV sub-samples.
Interesting results are: (1) HtV firms earn lower CARs on aver-
age; (2) some HtV sub-samples have a negative average industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q, suggesting lower valuations; (3) HtV firms do
not always increase innovation, as proxied by an increase R&D after
the takeover; and, (4) HtV firms pay higher premiums on average
(which is consistent with either acquiring high-synergy targets or
overpaying). These results neither support nor undermine the pre-
dictions in Section 3; instead, it is necessary to examine how the
key variables change with the adoption of more ATPs.
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Table 4 contains univariate statistics for HtV companies sorted
by whether they have a GIM index of at least 10. Panel C com-
pares high-ATP HtV companies with low-ATP HtV companies. The
key results are: First, HtV companies make acquisitions that have
higher CARs. Second, the acquisitions have a less-negative impact
on industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Third, HtV companies are also more
likely to make acquisitions that create value and increase R&D ex-
penditure. While ATPs reduce the likelihood that a HighDispersion
or HighVariability firm makes a value-creating acquisition of a high-
tech target, the difference-result in Panel C is not significant and
(in unreported analysis) reflects the lower probability of acquiring a
high tech target.14 Fourth, if the initial acquisition destroyed value
(had a CAR< 0), then ATPs increase the likelihood that the HtV
will be acquired. Overall, these results are laregly consistent with
the predictions in Section 3.
Table 5 analyzes the CARs in further detail. It examines the
relation between CARs and various definitions of being a high-ATP
company.15
Panel A contains the results for all bidders, the results sug-
gest that bidders in general make profitable takeovers (supporting
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004), but that ATPs encourage
takeovers that are less profitable (consistent with Masulis, Wang,
and Xie, 2007).
14Section 5.4 controls for the possibility that some acquirers are less likely to acquire a
high-tech target by examining the probability that a bid creates value conditional on it being
for a high-tech target.
15Note that for medical companies, all companies that have a Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) index of at least 10 also have a classified board. Thus, the results in the gim columns
(Columns 2-4) are the same as in the dic columns (Columns 8-10).
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The univariate results in Panels B to E suggest that ATPs enable
managers of hard to value companies to focus on long-term value-
creation. Several results are notable: First, if the firm is HtV and
has more ATPs, then the market reacts significantly positively to
its acquisition announcements. Second, if a HtV firm has GIM<
10, BCF< 3, or DIC= 0, then the market will react insignificantly
negatively to its takeovers. Third, if the firm is not HtV, but has
more ATPs (GIM≥ 10, BCF≥ 3, or DIC= 1), then the market
reacts significantly negatively to its takeovers.
5.2 Market-Reaction Analysis
The first key issue is whether the market reacts positively to acqui-
sitions by HtV firms who have more ATPs. The multivariate model
is in Equation (11).
CARs = f(HtV,GIM≥10,HTV × GIM≥10,Controls) (11)
Here, ‘CARs’ is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return based on
an OLS estimation of the market model over the period 11 days to
210 days before the announcement; ‘HtV’ is one of the five proxies
for being a hard-to-value company; ‘GIM≥ 10’ is an indicator that
the firm’s GIM index is at least 10; and, ‘Controls’ denotes the con-
trol variables. The model uses standard errors clustered by 3-digit
SIC industry and includes year-dummies (consistent with Johnson,
Moorman, and Sorescu, 2009; Petersen, 2009).
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The results confirm that the market reacts positively to takeovers
by HtV firms that have ATPs. Table 6 contains the OLS regression
results. The first key result is that the market responds negatively to
bidders that have more ATPs (the coefficient on ‘dic’ is negative and
significant). This quadrates with findings in prior literature (see for
example Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner,
and Powell, 2010). The second key result is that the market reacts
positively to the acquisitions of HtV bidders if they have more ATPs
(the interaction of ‘dic’ and all five HtV dummies is significant and
positive). This supports the hypothesis that ATPs can encourage
managers of HtV firms to make value-increasing investments.
The signs on the control variables are largely consistent with
expectations. The results support prior findings that the market
reacts negatively to large bidders’ takeovers (see Moeller, Schlinge-
mann, and Stulz, 2004); acquisitions by bidders with high equity
valuations, as proxied by P/RIV (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and
Powell, 2010); acquisitions where there are multiple bidders; and,
acquisitions of listed targets paid for with stock (Chang, 1998).
The OLS results overall support the hypothesis that ATPs enable
managers of hard to value companies to implement value-creating
investments. The OLS findings indicate that the univariate results
do not merely reflect spurious correlation. This motivates exami-
nation of whether software-dictators also have higher post-takeover
performance.
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5.3 Do these acquisitions increase long-term value?
The second key issue is whether these acquisitions improve long term




HTV × GIM≥ 10,Controls)
(12)
Here, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
estimated i years after the announcement. The tables report the
results for 1 year after the announcement because the immediate
hurdles of acquisition integration and fees impose immediate pres-
sure on corporate values. ‘HtV’ is one of five hard-to-value proxies,
‘GIM≥ 10’ equals one if the firm has a GIM index of at least 10,
and ‘Controls’ denotes the controls. The model uses fewer controls
than in Section 5.2 because some deal-based variables should not
logically influence the acquirer’s long-term value.16 The models use
robust standard errors clustered by 3-digit SIC code and include
year dummies.
Table 7 contains regression results where the dependent variable
is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q one year after the acquisition.
HtV acquirers perform worse on average. Firms with more ATPs
have lower values on average (consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2008). However, the in-
teraction ‘GIM≥ 10×HtV’ is positive and significant at 1% . Thus,
while hard to value companies tend to make worse acquisitions, on
16The results are qualitatively the same if the model includes all control variables.
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average, the presence of ATPs encourages managers to make acqui-
sitions that create more value.
The control variables are consistent with expectations. Pre-takeover
industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is significantly positively correlated
with post-takeover Tobin’s Q, reflecting auto-correlation in per-
formance (consistent with Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell,
2010). Further, post-takeover performance decreases with firm-size,
and cross-border diversification (supporting Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz, 2004; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Interestingly,
post-takeover performance increases with free-cash-flow, and de-
creases with leverage. But this may likely reflects the presence of
P/RIV, which controls for agency-conflicts due to high-valuation.
5.4 Value creating innovation
The third issue is whether ATPs encourage takeovers that induce
value-creating innovation. Thus the study examines whether ATPs
increase the likelihood that HtV firms (1) acquire a high-tech acqui-
sition and the market responds positively to this and (2) the firm’s
R&D expenditure increases following the acquisition and the mar-
ket responds positively. To ensure that the propensity to acquire
high-tech targets (as opposed to acquiring value-creating high-tech
targets) creates value, the study also examines whether ATPs in-
crease the chances of a positive market reaction conditional on the





 = f(HtV,ATPs,HTV × ATPs,Controls)
(13) I (R&Dt+i > R&Dt−1)
×Reaction≥0
 = f(HtV,ATPs,HTV × ATPs,Controls)
(14)
CAR ≥ 0 = f(HtV,ATPs,HTV × ATPs,Controls)
(15)
Here, R&D is the firm’s expenditure on R&D; TargetTech equals
one if the target is in a high tech industry as defined in Loughran
and Ritter (2002); HtV is one of five hard-to-value proxies; and,
GIM≥ 10 is an indicator that the firm has a GIM index of at least
10. The control variables are as in Section 5.2 except that they omit
‘BothTech’ and ‘Tech×RelSize’ to avoid endogeneity. Equation (15)
restricts the sample to the sub-sample of 1016 acquisitions that are
for high-tech targets as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2002). The
models use robust standard errors clustered by 3-digit SIC code.
The results are in Table 8. The control variables are suppressed
for brevity. Looking at Panels A - C. The key result is that the
coefficient on ‘HtV×GIM ≥ 10’ is positive and significant across all
HtV specifications in Panels B and C and across four HtV specifi-
cations in Panel A. Unsurprisingly, there is a negative coefficient
on ‘GIM≥ 10’, confirming that ATPs can reduce value in non-
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HtV firms. Overall, this implies that ATPs encourage HtV firms
to increase innovation and this innovation creates value. Looking
at Panel D, the coefficient on ‘HtV × GIM ≥ 10’ is positive and
significant for four HtV specifications. Thus, conditional on the ac-
quisition being for a high-tech target, ATPs increase the probability
that a HtV firm will make an acquisition that creates value. Over-
all, these results indicate that ATPs encourage HtV firms to make
acquisitions that generate value.
5.5 Post-acquisition takeovers
The hypothesis that ATPs benefit the shareholders of HtV compa-
nies rests on the assumption that ATPs do not entrench managers
so as to protect them from disciplinary takeovers and ATPs may
protect them from opportunistic takeovers.
The study analyzes this using multivariate logit regressions. Es-
timation is by logit since the possibility of non-normality in the
residuals may bias probit results (Berra, Jarque, and Lee, 1984).
Equation (16)
Acquired = f (HtV,HtV × GIM≥ 10,HtV × Reaction< 0,
HtV × GIM≥ 10 × Reaction< 0,Controls)
(16)
Here, ‘Acquired’ is an indicator that equals one if the initial bid-
der is acquired within four years of that initial bid; ‘HtV’ denotes
the hard-to-value proxies; ‘GIM≥ 10’ equals one if the firm has a
GIM index of at least 10; and ‘Controls’ denotes the control vari-
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ables. The models use robust standard errors clustered by 3-digit
SIC code and include year dummies.17
The bidder and deal variables are largely as in Section 5.2. How-
ever, there are two key changes. First, following Offenberg (2009),
the models include the Herfindahl-Hishman Index (‘HHI’) of the
initial-bidder’s industry since a high HHI indicates a crowded indus-
try, which might reduce the probability of receiving a takeover-bid
(Powell, 1997; Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis, 2009).18 Second,
the models exclude variables that would not theoretically influence
the likelihood of receiving a bid. These include whether the ini-
tial target was publicly listed, the method of payment, stock-price
run-up in the initial acquisition, abnormal volume in the initial ac-
quisition, the tech-status of the initial target, and the industry-
relatedness of the bidder and the target.19
Now, if ATPs protect managers from opportunistic takeovers but
do not insulate them from disciplinary ones, then (1) there should
be a negative coefficient on ‘HtV×GIM≥ 10’, suggesting that ATPs
make an acquisition of a HtV company less likely; and (2) there
should be a positive coefficient on ‘HtV×GIM≥ 10 ×CAR≤ 0’, sug-
gesting that HtV companies are still disciplined for value-destroying
decisions, even if they have more ATPs.
The results show that ATPs do not entrench managers of HtV
companies. There are two key results. First, for four HtV proxies,
17The results are robust to the use of the cross-derivative-method proposed in Ai and Norton
(2003), which corrects coefficient-estimates and standard errors of interaction terms Norton,
Wang, and Ai (2004); Ai and Norton (2003); Brambor, Roberts Clark, and Golder (2006);
Powers (2005)
18The results are unchanged in models that replace HHI with a dummy that equals 1 if the
number of firms in the industry is in the top 25% of all industries.
19Robustness tests include all the original variables. The results are qualitatively the same.
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HtV firms that have more ATPs are less likely to be targeted (the
coefficient on GIM≥ 10*HtV is negative and significant for all HtV
variables except HighError). Second, HtV firms that have more
ATPs are more likely to be acquired if they make a value destroy-
ing takeover. That is, the coefficient on CAR< 0 × GIM≥ 10 ×
HtV is positive in all models, and is significant for the HtV variables
HighVariability, HighDispersion, and HighError. Together, these re-
sults suggest that ATPs do not insulate HtV firms from disciplinary
takeovers, but do protect them from opportunistic ones.
The control variables are largely as expected. Especially rele-
vant results are that high free cash flow firms are more likely to be
taken over, consistent with the theory that free cash flow induces
agency conflicts and poor acquisitions (see Jensen, 1986). Further, a
high Herfindahl-Hirshman index reduces the likelihood of receiving
a takeover bid. This suggests that acquisitions are less likely in con-
centrated industries and may suggest that anti-takeover regulations
can inhibit some acquisitions. One interesting result is that ATPs in
general do not reduce the likelihood of a takeover bid. This appears
inconsistent with evidence that ATPs reduce the likelihood of receiv-
ing a takeover bid (as in Daines and Klausner, 2001; Casares and
Karpoff, 2002). However, this may be because this paper focuses
on a sample of acquirers rather than the population of all firms.
Nonetheless, it suggests that ATPs may not be a wholly effective
entrenchment mechanism.
These results combined with the foregoing results suggest that
ATPs enable HtV companies to make acquisitions that are more
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profitable and that ATPs do not entrench managers of HtV compa-
nies. Together, these results strongly support the theory that ATPs
enable managers of HtV companies to focus on value creation.
5.6 The reaction to takeover premiums
The prediction is that the market should react positively to the
takeover premiums that HtV firms pay. The regression specification
is:
CAR = f(HtV,GIM≥ 10,ProxyPremium(i),
HtV× ProxyPremium(i),GIM≥ 10× ProxyPremium(i),
HtV× ProxyPremium(i) ×GIM≥ 10,Controls)
(17)
Here, CAR is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding
the announcement of the takeover; GIM≥ 10 indicates if the firm has
a GIM index of at least 10 and HtV is one of five HtV indicators. The
proxy premium (denoted ‘ProxyPremium(i)’) is the average premium
paid for firms in the target’s SIC 2-digit industry in that year, where
the takeover premium is variously the transaction value divided by
the target’s stock price i-days before the acquisition, where i-days is
various 3-days, 11-days, or 21-days . The controls are as in Section
5.2. The models use robust standard errors clustered by 3-digit SIC
industry and include industry dummies.
The results are in Table 10. The key result is that the coefficient
on ‘HtV × ProxyPremium(i) × GIM≥ 10’ is positive and significant
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for four of the five HtV variables for all proxy premium specifica-
tions. The coefficient on ‘ProxyPremium’ is positive. This appears
surprising; however, reflects the inclusion of ‘ProxyPremium’ in sev-
eral interaction terms, and ‘ProxyPremium’ has a significant neg-
ative univariate correlation with CARs. The table omits control
variables for brevity, although they are largely consistent with the
results reported in Section 5.2.
These results imply that for HtV firms use takeover premiums
productively to acquire targets that have high value.
5.7 Robustness and endogeneity
This section ensures that the results are robust. The results are
robust in several ways. First, the results are robust to other ATP-
measures. Specifically, the results hold in models that use CBD and
PPILL, dummies that equal 1 if the firm has a classified board or
has poison pills, respectively. The results also hold in models that
use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index or the Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) index (denoted ‘BCF’). Second, the results
are robust to industry, year and firm clustering. The results hold in
models that replace year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered
by year and industry. The results also hold in models that cluster
standard errors by firm rather than by industry. The results are
qualitatively the same when industry is defined using SIC 2-digit,
3-digit, and 4-digit codes.
Third, the results are robust to multi-collinearity. The VIF does
not exceed two for any variable in the models. Nonetheless, the re-
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lation between the HtV variable, ATPs and the dependent variables
holds in models that replace the bidder and deal control variables
with principal components that reflect the bidder and deal charac-
teristics. Table 11 contains these results the PCA-regression results.
The results re-enforce the relation between ATPs and CARs, and
the positive relation between CARs and the combination of ATPs
and being a software-firm. Fourth, they hold in different definitions
of CARs, holding in models that use the event windows (-1,1), (-2,2),
and (-5,5). Fifth, the takeover-likelihood-prediction models hold in
both logit and probit models. Sixth, the results are robust to defini-
tion of takeover premium, holding in models that define premium as
the transaction value divided by the target’s market value 11-days,
21-days, or 31-days before the acquisition announcement. Seventh,
they are robust to the examination of Tobin’s Q, and industry ad-
justed Tobin’s Q, 1, 2, or 3 years after the acquisition. The industry
adjusted Tobin’s Q is also robust to the subtraction of either the in-
dustry mean or median, and for industry being defined as the firm’s
2-digit, 3-digit, or 4-digit SIC industry.
Fourth, the results are to endogeneity. I address endogeneity
by replacing the ATP index with a ‘Residual ATP’ index that is
the residual from a first-stage regression that predicts the level of
ATPs (following Pagan, 1984; Murphy and Topel, 2002; Harford,
Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2010). The ‘Residual ATP’ repre-
sents that proportion of the ATP index that is not due to other firm
and governance characteristics.20 For brevity, I only report the sec-
20These characteristics are: a dummy that equals one if the firm was sued under a share-
holder class action in the last 12 months, the proportion of inside directors, a CEO-chairman
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ond stage regression that examines acquisition CARs. The results
are in Table 12. The key findings are that (1) the coefficient on the
‘Residual GIM’ variable is negative and significant whereas (2) the
coefficient on the interaction of the ‘Residual GIM’ variable with the
‘HtV’ variable is positive and significant in all models. This sup-
ports the hypothesis that ATPs can create value in HtV companies.
There is similar support for the other models in the paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines whether ATPs can ameliorate agency conflicts
of managerial risk aversion. The results suggest that ATPs enable
managers of hard to value firms to make value-creating acquisitions
and encourage value-creating innovation, and that ATPs do not in-
sulate managers of HtV firms from disciplinary takeovers. Unlike
prior literature, which has focused on messy proxies for long-term
value, this paper focuses on the market’s reaction to an event, about
which ATPs may convey new news. In so doing, this addresses the
inconsistent findings in the literature that ATPs may reduce value
for some, but not for all, firms. These results contribute to two
bodies of literature. First, they contribute the governance literature
by clarifying the relation between ATPs and firm value. Second,
they contribute to the managerial incentive literature by showing
one way to reduce agency conflicts of managerial risk-aversion. The
duality indicator, the log of the CEO’s age, the log of the CEO’s tenure, the proportion of
incentive pay to total pay, the level of insider ownership, a high-tech dummy, the natural log
of assets, the firm’s tobin’s Q, the industry-adjusted operating performance over assets, and
the HHI.
37
findings in this paper suggest that future research could focus on
the precise types of firm for which ATPs might destroy value.
38
7 Proofs
Proof 3 (Proof of Proposition 2.1) For clarity of exposition, solution pro-
ceeds in several steps.























Second, recall that the incentive compensation increases monotonically with
returns, but does so at a decreasing rate; that is, g′ > 0, and g′′ < 0. Thus,
























xT1 = 1 (20)
Third, note that (a) the returns are Gaussian, and (b) the manager is risk
averse with U ′m > 0 and U
′′
m < 0. Following well-established result in portfo-
lio optimization under a Gaussian distribution (see for example Pulley, 1981;















Fourth, note that the returns are Gaussian. Further, recall that the manager




= α. Thus, consistent with Gourieroux, Lau-
rent, and Scaillet (2000), El Ghaoui, Oks, and Oustry (2003), Scaillet (2004),















Thus, letting zA = zα






















Here, η(A) is the takeover threshold, and zA is the z-statistic associated with
the takeover threshold. Note that η(A) decreases with the level of ATPs, and
conversely, the absolute value of zA increases with the level of ATPs.
Fifth, now note that the firm will set the level of ATPs such that Equation
























xT1 = 1 (25)
Sixth, transform the problem into an ordinary optimization problem by elim-
inating the uncertainty sets. The approach follows that in Tütüncü and Koenig





s.t. xT Σ̄x = σ (27)
xTy − zA
√
xT Σ̄x = η(A) (28)
xT1 = 1 (29)














(xTy)2 − 2η(A)xTy + η2 = z2AxT Σ̄x
0 = η(A)2 − 2η(A)xTy + xTΩx
Where,
Ω = yyT − z2AΣ̄
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= yyT − z2AΣ̄
= Ω




s.t. η(A)2 − 2η(A)xTy + xTΩx = 0 (31)
xT1 = 1 (32)
Ninth, differentiate with respect to x and set to zero to obtain an optimum.
This induces the system of equations:
y − 2η(A)yλ1 + 2λ1Ωx + λ21 = 0 Derivative (33)
η(A)2 − 2η(A)xTy + xTΩx = 0 Constraint 1 (34)
1Tx = 0 Constraint 2 (35)
Tenth, solve Equation (33) with respect to x to obtain the optimal investment
vector. Here, this is
x∗ = (2Ω)
−1 (






2η(A)y − yλ−11 − (λ2/λ1)1
)
(36)
Proof 4 (Proof of Proposition 2.2) To see this, recall that the manager chooses




2η(A)y − yλ−11 − (λ2/λ1)1
)
.





2η(A)y − yλ−11 − (λ2/λ1)1
)
Now note that the Lagrange multipliers are positive. Further, recall that (a)
η(A) decreases with ATPs and (b) zA increases with the level of ATPs. Now,
the term z2AΣ̄ represents the combined impact of ATPs and return-variance.
Thus, increasing ATPs and return-variance increases the term z2AΣ̄. Noting
the negative sign and inverse power, this means that increasing the term z2AΣ̄
increases yTx∗. Thus, if the firm’s assets are more risky, then increasing ATPs
increases the firm’s total returns.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
CAR The cumulative abnormal returns accruing to the bidder for
the five days surrounding the announcement (from days -2,
to +2). Abnormal returns are the difference between actual
returns and predicted returns. The predicted return is based
on an OLS estimation of the market model with parameters
computed over the pariod 11 days to 210 days before the
announcement.
IaTobinQt+i The bidder’s industry adjusted Tobin’s Q i years after the
acquisition. The paper reports the results for i = 1. The
bidder’s Tobin’s Q is its market value of assets over its book
value of assets. The market value of assets is the firm’s mar-
ket capitalization plus book assets less its book equity. In
compustat terms this is (at - ceq+csho×price)/(at). The
firm’s industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is its Tobin’s Q less the
average Tobin’s Q in the firm’s SIC 4-digit industry.
CAR≥ 0 × I(R&Dt+i >
R&Dt−1)
The interaction of (a) an indicator that equals one if the CAR
is positive, and (b) an indicator that equals one if the R&D
expenditure in year t+ i exceeds that in year t− i, where year
t is the acquisition year.
CAR≥ 0 × TgtTech The interaction of (a) an indicator that equals one if the CAR
is positive and (b) an indicator that equals one if the target
is in a high-tech industry as defined in Loughran and Ritter
(2002).
Acquired An indicator that equals one if the initial acquirer receives a
takeover bid within 4 years of the acquisition
Valuation Difficulty Variables
Software A dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer is in the com-
puter software industry. These have the 4-digit SIC codes:
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379.
Medical A dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer is in the medi-
cal industry. Loughran and Ritter (2004) define these as firms
with 4-digit SIC code of 3841 or 3845. However, the results
also hold in an extended definition of medical firms as being
classified as as optical (SIC code 3827), surgical (SIC code
3841), orthopedic (SIC code 3842), dental (SIC code 3843),
electromedical (SIC code 3845), opthalmic (SIC code 3851),
or pharmaceutical (SIC code 2834). The reported models use
the Loughran and Ritter (2004) specification.
HighDispersion A dummy variable that equals one if the average of the stan-
dard deviation of analyst forecasts is in the top 25% of the
IBES population. The calculation is as follows. For each
forecast period IBES reports the standard deviation of the
analyst forecasts. Compute the average of the standard devi-
ations over the course of the year. The variable HighAveOfSd
equals one if the average of the standard deviations is in the
top 25% of the IBES population.
42
HighVariability This is based upon the 1-period ahead analyst forecasts
made over the 12 months before the acquisition announce-
ment. Here, each forecast period, IBES reports the mean
one-period-ahead analyst forecast. Compute the standard
deviation of the mean analyst forecasts over the course of the
year. The variable HighSdOfAve equals one if the standard
deviation of the mean analyst forecasts is in the top 25% of
the IBES population.
HighError A dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s average abso-
lute forecast error is in the top 25% of the IBES population.
For each forecast period, the absolute forecast error is the
absolute value of the difference between the earnings forecast
and the actual earnings. An acquirer is a HighError firm if
the average absolute forecast error over the year before the
acquisition is in the top 25% of the IBES population.
Governance Variables
GIM The index of 24 ATPs used in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003). A firm’s gim score is the number of these 24 ATPs
that the firm has.
GIM≥ 10 An indicator that equals 1 if the firm has a gim score of at
least 10 and has a classified board, and equals 0 otherwise.
The reported models use this as the key governance variable.
BCF The index of 6 ATPs used in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2008). A firm’s bcf score is the number of these 6 ATPs the
firm has.
CBD An indicator that equals 1 if the firm has a classified board.
PPILL An indicator that equals 1 if the firm has a classified board.
Firm level variables
LnAssets The natural log of the acquirer’s total assets (Compustat
code: at).
P/RIV The firm’s stock price (‘P’) to a measure of its true value
(Residual Income Value, ‘RIV’). The computation of RIV is
as in Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2010).
FCF/MVA The firm’s free cash flow scaled by the market value of assets.
In Compustat codes, the free cash flow is (oibdp-xint - txt-
capx)/(at - ceq+csho×price), and the market value of assets
is (at - ceq+csho×price), where ‘price’ is the firm’s share price
35 days before the announcement.
Leverage The long-term debt (Compustat: dltt) scaled by the mar-
ket value of assets (Compustat: at - ceq+csho×price, where
‘price’ is the firm’s share price 35 days before the announce-
ment soruced from CRSP).
TobinQ Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets (at - ceq+csho×price,
where ‘price’ is the firm’s share price 35 days before the an-
nouncement) scaled by the book value of assets (Compustat:
at).
Deal level variables
RunUp The RunUp variable is the firm’s buy-and-hold-abnormal-
return (BHAR) earned over the period 210 days to 11 days
before the takeover. The abnormal returns are based on an
OLS estimation of the market model computed over 200 days
before this period.
Volume The measure of abnormal volume on day t is the turnover
on day t less that predicted by an OLS estimation of a
turnover-based market-model (computed over a prior 200 day
period). The ‘Volume’ variable is the cumulative abnormal
volume over the window from 10-days to 30-days before the
announcement.
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RelSize The transaction value divided by the bidder’s market value
11 days before the announcement.
BothTech ‘BothTech’ equals one if both the bidder and target are
in high-tech industries as defined in Loughran and Ritter
(2002).21
Diversifying An indicator that equals one if the bidder and target are in
different Fama-French 48 industries. The results are quali-
tatively the same when defining diversifying acquisitions as
those in which the bidder and target are in different 2-digit,
3-digit, and 4-digit SIC codes.
CrossBorder An indicator that equals one if the bidder and target are
based in different countries.
Friendly An indicator that equals one if SDC codes the deal as neither
hostile nor unsolicited.
Competition An indicator that equals one if there was more than one bid-
der.
Method of Payment &
Target Status interactions
The indicators ‘Public’, ‘Private’, ‘Subsidiary’ represent an
acquisition of a listed target, an unlisted target, a subsidiary.
The terms ‘Cash’ and ‘Stock’ equal one if the bidder paid
with some cash, or with only stock, respectively. The models
control for the interactions of the variables.
IndustryM&A The total value of the takeover transactions in the target’s
industry in the past year
CAR< 0 An indicator variable that equals one if the bidder’s market
value falls following the acquisition (i.e. the 5-day CAR is
negative).
BidderComp1-3 Principal components derived from the bidder-based vari-
ables: lnta, priv, tobinq, fcf, and leverage.
AcqComp1-8 Principal components derived from acquisition based vari-
ables: bhar, indma, relsize, bothtech, tech*relsize, conglom-
erate, pub*cash, pub*stock, priv*cash, priv*stock, sub*cash,
competed, volume, crossBorder, friendly, and serial.
21They define high tech firms as firms in the industries: computer hardware (SIC codes:
3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578); comunications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669); electronics (3671,
3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); measuring and controlling
devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829); medical instruments (3841, 3845); telephone equipment
(4812, 4813); communications services (4899); and software (7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375,
7378, 7379).
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Table 2: Takeovers by year
The sample comprises a total of 3935 acquisitions made between 1990 and 2005. Column 1 contains the total number of acquisitions in a
given year. Column 2 (Column 3) contains the number of acquisitions that are by a software (non-software) company. Column 4 (Column 5)
contains the number of acquisitions that are by a medical (non-medical) company). Column 6 contains the average of the standard deviation
in analyst forecasts. Column 7 contains the standard deviation of the mean analyst forecast. Column 8 containst the average forecast error.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1990 119 11 108 2 117 0.090 0.157 0.338
1991 109 5 104 2 107 0.281 0.319 0.736
1992 121 12 109 3 118 0.064 0.101 0.159
1993 201 14 187 10 191 0.077 0.150 0.188
1994 225 11 214 10 215 0.063 0.099 0.161
1995 225 26 199 8 217 0.083 0.144 0.180
1996 232 17 215 11 221 0.069 0.121 0.156
1997 236 13 223 4 232 0.066 0.123 0.925
1998 382 40 342 15 367 0.079 0.212 0.331
1999 322 18 304 16 306 0.084 0.227 0.243
2000 279 31 248 8 271 0.125 0.330 0.430
2001 252 22 230 11 241 0.071 0.324 0.281
2002 319 55 264 12 307 0.058 0.197 0.338
2003 289 52 237 14 275 0.063 0.207 0.179
2004 336 40 296 18 318 0.058 0.169 0.173
2005 288 41 247 20 268 0.059 0.162 0.172
Overall 3935 408 3527 164 3771 0.087 0.190 0.312
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Table 3 contains summary statistics for the sample. All figures are means. Table 1 defines the variables. Column 1 examines all firms in the
sample. Columns 2-6 examine sub-sample of firms that are HtV. The HtV definition is in the column title.
All Firms Software Medical High Dispersion High Variability High Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent and Related Variables
CAR 0.301 0.035 -0.017 0.122 -0.006 0.500
IaTobinQt+3 0.155 0.190 0.300 -0.043 -0.100 -0.099
IaTobinQt+2 0.173 0.334 0.284 -0.032 -0.060 -0.115
IaTobinQt+1 0.192 0.406 0.339 -0.060 -0.043 -0.067
TgtTech 0.258 0.806 0.421 0.216 0.309 0.277
I(R&Dt+2 >
R&Dt−1)
0.915 0.902 0.872 0.814 0.840 0.848
I(R&Dt+1 >
R&Dt−1)
0.910 0.868 0.848 0.827 0.840 0.857
Acquired 0.133 0.211 0.116 0.188 0.144 0.089
ProxyPremium(3) 1.139 1.526 1.178 1.139 1.267 1.202
ProxyPremium(11) 1.196 1.586 1.273 1.191 1.329 1.256
ProxyPremium(21) 1.228 1.662 1.303 1.214 1.354 1.293
Panel B: Governance Variables
GIM 9.418 8.137 9.220 9.288 9.164 8.946
BCF 2.270 1.730 2.018 2.161 2.146 1.929
CBD 0.629 0.458 0.640 0.583 0.588 0.473
GIM≥ 10 0.484 0.270 0.439 0.487 0.455 0.473
BCF≥ 3 0.450 0.260 0.360 0.386 0.391 0.295
Panel C: Control Variables
Assets (USDm) 12154 2121 4643 3432 2401 2717
IaTobinQt−1 0.426 1.001 0.886 0.143 0.345 0.235
TobinQt−1 1.972 3.115 3.353 1.580 1.934 1.618
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P/RIV 2.137 3.652 3.198 1.699 1.759 0.591
FCF/MVA 0.017 0.020 0.032 -0.001 0.004 -0.009
Leverage 0.166 0.057 0.110 0.205 0.183 0.221
RunUp -0.071 -0.098 -0.086 -0.073 -0.128 -0.073
IndM&A 0.022 0.038 0.036 0.020 0.023 0.017
RelSize 0.133 0.090 0.113 0.170 0.148 0.195
Diversifying 0.369 0.328 0.372 0.363 0.407 0.438
Cash 0.552 0.525 0.579 0.565 0.572 0.580
Stock 0.448 0.475 0.421 0.435 0.428 0.420
Private 0.364 0.500 0.305 0.277 0.367 0.268
Public 0.317 0.297 0.378 0.343 0.290 0.348
Subsidiary 0.314 0.201 0.317 0.371 0.337 0.384
Competed 0.020 0.017 0.037 0.030 0.027 0.036
Volume 0.072 -0.105 0.163 0.057 0.120 0.120
CrossBorder 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.009
Friendly 0.989 0.988 0.976 0.983 0.987 0.991
Serial 0.200 0.201 0.116 0.124 0.160 0.071
HHI 0.154 0.106 0.091 0.144 0.152 0.12047
Table 4: Univariate Statistics for HtV firms
Table 4 contains univariate statistics for HtV firms sorted by whether they have a GIM index of at least 10. All figures are sample means.
The column title denotes the HtV measure. Panel A examines firms with GIM≥ 10; Panel B examines firms with GIM< 10; and, Panel C
takes the difference of Panel A and Panel B. The variables under analysis are: CAR is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return. ∆IaTobinQt+it−1
is the change in industry-adjusted tobin’s Q between year t + i and year t − 1, where t is the acquisition year. TgtTech indicates that the
target is a high-tech target as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2002). I(R&Dt+i > R&Dt−1) equals one if the R&D expenditure in year t+ i
exceeds that in year t− 1. Bid×CAR< 0 equals one if the initial acquirer is acquired within 4-years of the initial acquisition and the initial
acquisition had a negative CAR. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote a significant different from zero in Panel A and Panel B and denote a






Panel A: GIM≥ 10
CAR 1.146 0.679∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.295∗ 1.737∗∗∗
∆IaTobinQt+1t−1 -0.117 -0.541
∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ 0.071
∆IaTobinQt+2t−1 -0.290 -0.603
∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
∆IaTobinQt+3t−1 -0.416 -0.866
∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.210∗ 0.130∗∗∗
TgtTech × CAR≥ 0 0.588∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
I(R&Dt+1 > R&Dt−1)× CAR > 0 0.545∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
I(R&Dt+2 > R&Dt−1)× CAR > 0 0.564∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
Acquired×CAR< 0 0.164∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.038
Panel B: GIM< 10
CAR -0.375∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.611∗∗
∆IaTobinQt+1t−1 -0.765
∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.643∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗
∆IaTobinQt+2t−1 -0.975
∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.648∗∗
∆IaTobinQt+3t−1 -1.149
∗∗∗ -0.489∗ -0.295∗ -0.711∗∗∗ -0.615
TgtTech × CAR≥ 0 0.396∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
I(R&Dt+1 > R&Dt−1)× CAR > 0 0.433∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
I(R&Dt+2 > R&Dt−1)× CAR > 0 0.453∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
Acquired×CAR< 0 0.057∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.000
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Panel C: Difference: GIM≥ 10 - GIM< 10
CAR 1.521 1.241∗∗ 0.213∗ 0.552∗ 2.347∗
∆IaTobinQt+1t−1 0.648
∗∗∗ -0.105 0.193∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗
∆IaTobinQt+2t−1 0.685
∗∗∗ -0.087 0.215∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗
∆IaTobinQt+3t−1 0.732
∗∗ -0.377 0.215∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗
TgtTech × CAR≥ 0 0.193∗ 0.024 -0.021 -0.076 0.053∗
I(R&Dt+1 > R&Dt−1)× CAR > 0 0.113∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.029 0.060∗ 0.154∗∗
I(R&Dt+2 > R&Dt−1)× CAR > 0 0.111∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.014 0.044 0.137∗∗
Acquired×CAR< 0 0.107∗∗∗ 0.018 0.022∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.038
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Table 5: Univariate statistics by governance and software classification
Table 5 contains the univariate for the 5-day market model abnormal return, sorted by the level of ATPs, for the takeover performance
of high valuation difficulty versus low valuation difficulty companies. Panels A - E measure valuation difficulty based upon being in the
software industry, being in the medical industry, having high forecast dispersion, having high forecast variability and having high forecast
error. Numbers in normal font are mean 5-day CARs, and numbers in italics are median 5-day CARs. Table 1 defines the variables.
Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively using ttests for means
and non-parametric sign tests for medians.







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All 0.301∗∗∗ -0.036 0.617∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -0.011 0.556∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ -0.036 0.617∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗






HtV=1 0.035 1.146∗ -0.375 1.521 0.459∗ -0.114 0.573 1.146∗ -0.375 1.521
0.204 1.227∗∗ -0.342 1.569∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.166 0.180 1.227∗∗ -0.342 1.569∗













Difference -0.296 1.254∗∗ -1.162∗ 0.501∗∗ -0.778∗ 1.254∗∗ -1.162∗∗∗
0.098 1.464∗∗ -0.779 0.520 -0.156 1.464∗∗ -0.779
Panel B: Medical
HtV=1 -0.017 0.679∗∗∗ -0.562 1.241∗∗ 0.742∗∗ -0.443 1.185∗ 0.679∗∗ -0.562 1.241∗
-0.134 0.074∗∗ -0.462 0.537∗ 0.540∗ -0.606 1.146 0.074∗∗ -0.462 0.537∗
HtV=0 0.315∗∗∗ -0.064 0.673∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗ -0.037 0.607∗∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗ -0.064 0.673∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗






Difference -0.332 0.743∗∗ -1.235 0.779∗∗ -1.050 0.743∗∗ -1.235
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-0.262 0.277∗ -0.884 0.693 -0.981 0.277∗ -0.884
Panel C: Forecast Dispersion
HtV=1 0.122 0.231∗ 0.018 0.213∗ -0.207 0.328 -0.535 0.231∗ 0.018 0.213∗
-0.282 -0.202 -0.321 0.118 -0.721 -0.102 -0.619 -0.202 -0.321 0.118
HtV=0 0.330∗∗∗ -0.078 0.712∗∗∗ -0.790∗∗∗ 0.015 0.598∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.078 0.712∗∗∗ -0.790∗∗∗













Panel D: Forecast Variability
HtV=1 -0.006 0.295∗∗∗ -0.257 0.552∗ 0.224∗∗ -0.154 0.378∗∗ 0.295∗∗ -0.257 0.552∗
-0.075 0.294∗∗ -0.229 0.523∗ 0.172∗∗ -0.167 0.339∗ 0.294∗ -0.229 0.523∗
HtV=0 0.381∗∗∗ -0.115 0.862∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -0.063 0.767∗∗∗ -0.830∗∗∗ -0.115 0.862∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗













Panel E: Forecast Error
HtV=1 0.500 1.737∗ -0.611 2.347∗ 0.605∗∗ 0.456 0.148∗ 1.737∗∗ -0.611 2.347∗
-0.253 0.693∗ -0.500 1.193∗ -1.149 0.011 -1.160 0.693∗ -0.500 1.193∗
HtV=0 0.295∗∗∗ -0.086 0.654∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -0.023 0.560∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.086 0.654∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗






Difference 0.205 1.823∗∗ -1.264 0.628∗ -0.104∗∗∗ 1.823∗∗ -1.264∗∗∗





Table 6: 5-day CARs Regression Results
Table 6 contains OLS estimates of Equation 11. The dependent variable is the 5-day market model cumulative abnormal return. The column
title indicates the valuation difficulty dummy. Table 1 defines the variables. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **, and *
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Software Medical HighDispersion HighVariability HighError
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GIM≥ 10 -0.758∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗ -0.714∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗
[0.005] [0.026] [0.026] [0.007] [0.022]
HtV -0.930∗∗∗ -1.464∗∗∗ -0.442 -0.744∗∗ -1.261
[0.005] [0.000] [0.355] [0.035] [0.201]
GIM≥ 10 × HtV 1.858∗∗∗ 1.858∗∗∗ 0.929∗ 1.316∗∗ 3.128∗∗
[0.000] [0.002] [0.095] [0.010] [0.013]
LnAssetst−1 -0.373∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
TobinQt−1 0.304∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.299∗∗
[0.021] [0.016] [0.021] [0.031] [0.019]
P/RIV -0.080∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
FCF/MVAt−1 5.946 6.535 6.081 5.727 6.185
[0.152] [0.120] [0.144] [0.172] [0.150]
Leveraget−1 3.017∗∗∗ 3.252∗∗∗ 3.223∗∗∗ 3.099∗∗∗ 3.130∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007]
RunUp 0.059 0.057 0.066 0.012 0.073
[0.874] [0.878] [0.860] [0.975] [0.846]
IndustryM&A 2.542 1.901 1.363 1.848 1.064
[0.642] [0.715] [0.790] [0.720] [0.834]
RelSize 0.574 0.546 0.588 0.589 0.585
[0.517] [0.538] [0.512] [0.505] [0.512]
BothTech 0.514 0.45 0.504 0.49 0.482
[0.118] [0.137] [0.118] [0.121] [0.136]
BothTech × RelSize -7.158∗∗∗ -7.307∗∗∗ -7.509∗∗∗ -7.446∗∗∗ -7.641∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Diversifying 0.01 -0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.003
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[0.963] [0.988] [0.992] [0.977] [0.991]
Public × Cash 0.304 0.306 0.287 0.261 0.32
[0.447] [0.438] [0.469] [0.515] [0.414]
Public× Stock -2.011∗∗∗ -1.993∗∗∗ -1.998∗∗∗ -2.011∗∗∗ -2.003∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Private × Cash 0.387 0.373 0.397 0.37 0.388
[0.187] [0.201] [0.175] [0.206] [0.190]
Private × Stock 0.238 0.222 0.198 0.217 0.206
[0.647] [0.657] [0.692] [0.662] [0.678]
Subsidiary × 1.071∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗
Cash [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Competed -1.578∗∗ -1.582∗∗ -1.595∗∗ -1.610∗∗ -1.551∗∗
[0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.015]
Volume 0.159 0.165 0.157 0.161 0.161
[0.156] [0.140] [0.153] [0.142] [0.144]
CrossBorder 2.879∗∗ 2.834∗∗ 2.944∗∗ 2.863∗∗ 2.922∗∗
[0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] [0.020]
Friendly -2.617∗∗∗ -2.565∗∗∗ -2.471∗∗∗ -2.522∗∗∗ -2.507∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
Serial 0.201 0.169 0.192 0.175 0.184
[0.428] [0.486] [0.436] [0.480] [0.450]
Constant 4.973∗∗∗ 4.920∗∗∗ 4.784∗∗∗ 4.971∗∗∗ 4.835∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 3,935 3,935 3,935 3,935 3,935
R-squared 6.60% 6.50% 6.50% 6.60% 6.60%
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Table 7: Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
Table 7 examines the relation between governance, risk and post-takeover performance, as proxied by Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q. It
contains OLS estimates of Equation (12). The dependent variable is the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q one year after the acquisition. The
column title contains the valuation difficulty variable. Table 1 defines the variables. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
software medical HighDispersion HighVariability HighError
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IaTobinQt−1 0.198∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
GIM≥ 0 -0.091 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.109 -0.074
[0.122] [0.009] [0.195] [0.100] [0.176]
HtV -0.175∗∗ -0.374∗∗ -0.194∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.158
[0.014] [0.028] [0.012] [0.000] [0.114]
GIM≥ 0×HtV 0.200∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.168∗ 0.096∗∗
[0.008] [0.000] [0.062] [0.077] [0.046]
LnAssetst−1 -0.019 -0.016 -0.012 -0.012 -0.015
[0.232] [0.314] [0.450] [0.447] [0.313]
P/RIV 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
[0.189] [0.244] [0.249] [0.326] [0.235]
FCF/MVAt−1 0.930∗∗ 0.989∗∗ 0.668∗ 0.545 0.886∗∗
[0.033] [0.016] [0.076] [0.148] [0.034]
Leveraget−1 -1.130∗∗∗ -1.070∗∗∗ -1.067∗∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗ -1.076∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
RelSize -0.199∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
BothTech -0.013 -0.028 -0.04 -0.038 -0.023
[0.778] [0.494] [0.401] [0.417] [0.609]
BothTech × RelSize -0.265 -0.333∗ -0.315 -0.275 -0.361∗
[0.178] [0.086] [0.100] [0.136] [0.068]
Diversifying -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 0 -0.007
[0.846] [0.854] [0.847] [0.994] [0.871]
CrossBorder -0.175 -0.207 -0.149 -0.181 -0.169
[0.163] [0.122] [0.220] [0.162] [0.173]
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Serial 0.06 0.056 0.046 0.051 0.054
[0.304] [0.318] [0.408] [0.366] [0.336]
Constant 0.420∗∗ 0.388∗ 0.376∗ 0.425∗∗ 0.372∗
[0.048] [0.058] [0.066] [0.038] [0.065]
Observations 3,709 3,709 3,709 3,709 3,709
R-squared 21.80% 22.30% 21.90% 22.30% 21.70%
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Table 8: Valuation Creating Innovation
Table 8 examines whether ATPs enable HtV firms to make takeovers that both increase innovation and firm value. The panel heading states
the dependent variable in each model. The control variables are suppressed for brevity. They are as in Table 6, except the models omit
‘BothTech’ and ‘Tech×RelSize’ to avoid endogeneity. Table 1 defines the variables. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Software Medical HighDispersion HighVariability HighError
Panel A: Dependent Variable: CAR≥ 0 × TgtTech
GIM≥ 10 -0.444∗∗ -0.403∗∗ -0.435∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗
[0.037] [0.019] [0.016] [0.004] [0.012]
HtV 0.652∗∗ -0.702 -0.122 0.254 0.098
[0.027] [0.107] [0.523] [0.198] [0.819]
HtV × GIM≥ 10 0.551∗∗ 0.476∗∗ 0.474∗ 0.234 1.218∗∗
[0.012] [0.035] [0.066] [0.350] [0.011]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.781 -1.132 -1.171 -1.221 -1.244
[0.119] [0.321] [0.310] [0.287] [0.267]
Observations 3935 3935 3935 3935 3935
Pseudo-R2 20.20% 19.20% 19.00% 19.20% 19.20%
Panel B: Dependent Variable: CAR≥ 0 × I(R&Dt+1 > R&Dt−1)
GIM≥ 10 -0.237∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗
[0.001] [0.031] [0.014] [0.001] [0.014]
HtV -0.293∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ -0.506∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.016] [0.008] [0.068]
HtV × GIM≥ 10 0.568∗∗∗ 0.248 0.380∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.169] [0.055] [0.005] [0.003]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.866∗∗ 0.823∗∗ 0.818∗∗ 0.883∗∗ 0.806∗∗
[0.035] [0.039] [0.041] [0.033] [0.045]
Observations 3935 3935 3935 3935 3935
Pseudo-R2 3.59% 3.56% 3.62% 3.67% 3.56%
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Panel C: Dependent Variable: CAR≥ 0 × I(R&Dt+2 > R&Dt−1)
GIM≥ 10 -0.223∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗ -0.211∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗
[0.001] [0.024] [0.022] [0.003] [0.018]
HtV -0.254∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗ -0.280∗∗ -0.423∗
[0.001] [0.000] [0.022] [0.026] [0.094]
HtV × GIM≥ 10 0.555∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.28 0.417∗∗ 0.778∗∗
[0.000] [0.003] [0.181] [0.023] [0.019]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.071∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Observations 3935 3935 3935 3935 3935
Pseudo-R2 3.63% 3.60% 3.64% 3.65% 3.59%
Panel D: Dependent Variable: CAR≥ 0; target must be high-tech
GIM≥ 10 -0.317∗∗ -0.159 -0.237 -0.274 -0.14
[0.035] [0.398] [0.215] [0.165] [0.379]
HtV -0.255∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗ -0.456∗ -0.15 0.286
[0.007] [0.048] [0.060] [0.232] [0.599]
HtV × GIM≥ 10 0.678∗∗∗ 0.504∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 0.12
[0.000] [0.051] [0.002] [0.030] [0.896]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1016 1016 1016 1016 1016
Pseudo-R2 6.08% 6.04% 6.12% 6.06% 5.80%
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Table 9: Takeover Likelihood Predictions
Table 9 contains logit estimates of Equation 16. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the acquirer receives a takeover bid
within four years of the initial acquisition. The title of each column indicates the valuation difficulty variable. Table 1 defines the variables.
Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
software medical HighDispersion HighVariability HighError
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR< 0 -0.444∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗ -0.267 -0.179 -0.397∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.003] [0.113] [0.346] [0.010]
GIM≥ 10 0.042 0.242 0.401∗ 0.367∗ 0.263
[0.804] [0.236] [0.084] [0.063] [0.173]
HtV 0.13 -0.402 1.270∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.286
[0.454] [0.273] [0.000] [0.000] [0.594]
GIM≥ 10×CAR< 0 -0.07 -0.113 -0.337 -0.502∗∗ -0.162
[0.765] [0.583] [0.195] [0.017] [0.417]
GIM≥ 10 × HtV -1.619∗∗∗ -1.530∗ -1.013∗∗ -0.726∗∗ -1.321
[0.000] [0.090] [0.038] [0.014] [0.146]
CAR< 0 × HtV 0.033 0.367 -1.092∗∗∗ -1.226∗∗∗ -14.632∗∗∗
[0.846] [0.280] [0.004] [0.002] [0.000]
CAR< 0×GIM≥
10×HtV
0.153 1.899 1.623∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗ 16.650∗∗∗
[0.525] [0.198] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000]
LnAssetst−1 -0.067 -0.113 -0.127 -0.114 -0.111
[0.489] [0.259] [0.216] [0.277] [0.272]
HHI -1.663∗ -2.039∗∗ -1.997∗∗ -2.021∗∗ -1.960∗∗
[0.089] [0.027] [0.041] [0.031] [0.029]
TobinQt−1 -0.266∗ -0.205 -0.19 -0.207 -0.22
[0.079] [0.212] [0.223] [0.190] [0.180]
P/RIV 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
[0.332] [0.258] [0.300] [0.263] [0.318]
FCF/MVAt−1 6.800∗∗∗ 7.123∗∗∗ 8.084∗∗∗ 7.621∗∗∗ 6.886∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Leveraget−1 -0.869 -1.062 -1.163 -1.105 -1.086
[0.365] [0.204] [0.173] [0.185] [0.204]
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Serial -0.655∗∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.617∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant -1.036 -0.622 -0.786 -0.837 -0.641
[0.127] [0.295] [0.220] [0.148] [0.268]
Observations 3935 3935 3935 3935 3935
Pseudo R-squared 8.48% 7.12% 7.98% 7.73% 7.21%
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Table 10: Takeover Premium Regressions
Table 10 examines the market’s reaction to premiums paid by HtV firms that have more ATPs. The dependent variable is the 5-day CAR
based on an OLS estimation of the market model. All models include the same controls as in Section 5.2 (suppressed for brevity). All
models use the ‘Industry Average’ premium (similarly to Officer, 2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2010).
The column title contains HtV variable. Table 1 defines the variables. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Software Medical HighDispersion HighVariability HighError
Panel A: 3-Day Premium
GIM≥ 10 -0.616∗ -0.581 -0.541 -0.548 -0.549
[0.094] [0.134] [0.167] [0.152] [0.158]
ProxyPremium(3) 0.214 0.205 0.238 0.252 0.22
[0.224] [0.197] [0.157] [0.118] [0.174]
HtV -1.118∗∗∗ -0.205 -0.412 -0.302 0.628
[0.002] [0.851] [0.257] [0.384] [0.510]
HtV × ProxyPremium(3) 0.21 -0.641 -0.197 -0.309 -0.665
[0.456] [0.331] [0.290] [0.336] [0.194]
GIM≥ 10 × ProxyPremium(3) -0.149 -0.086 -0.215 -0.256 -0.124
[0.513] [0.670] [0.322] [0.145] [0.537]
HtV × GIM≥ 10 × ProxyPremium(3) 0.860∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗ 0.767∗∗ 1.263
[0.000] [0.000] [0.021] [0.022] [0.157]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,169 3,169 3,169 3,169 3,169
R-squared 6.60% 6.50% 6.60% 6.60% 6.50%
Panel B: 11-Day Premium
GIM≥ 10 -0.594 -0.551 -0.512 -0.523 -0.521
[0.103] [0.154] [0.190] [0.172] [0.179]
ProxyPremium(11) 0.227 0.222 0.252 0.264∗ 0.236
[0.168] [0.137] [0.114] [0.081] [0.125]
HtV -1.129∗∗∗ -0.189 -0.433 -0.332 0.628
[0.002] [0.870] [0.229] [0.335] [0.510]
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HtV × ProxyPremium(11) 0.206 -0.595 -0.189 -0.278 -0.631
[0.432] [0.367] [0.295] [0.364] [0.182]
GIM≥ 10 × ProxyPremium(11) -0.161 -0.107 -0.235 -0.274 -0.142
[0.450] [0.577] [0.250] [0.100] [0.454]
HtV × GIM≥ 10 × ProxyPremium(11) 0.839∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗ 0.772∗∗ 1.201
[0.000] [0.000] [0.013] [0.013] [0.165]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,169 3,169 3,169 3,169 3,169
R-squared 6.60% 6.50% 6.60% 6.60% 6.50%
Panel C: 21-Day Premium
GIM≥ 10 -0.576 -0.534 -0.501 -0.511 -0.512
[0.115] [0.169] [0.203] [0.185] [0.192]
ProxyPremium(21) 0.213 0.211 0.228 0.247∗ 0.22
[0.193] [0.153] [0.149] [0.096] [0.146]
HtV -1.310∗∗∗ -0.239 -0.478 -0.356 0.475
[0.000] [0.837] [0.186] [0.296] [0.623]
HtV × ProxyPremium(21) 0.31 -0.551 -0.141 -0.253 -0.55
[0.256] [0.399] [0.421] [0.387] [0.233]
GIM≥ 10 × ProxyPremium(21) -0.184 -0.13 -0.253 -0.298∗ -0.162
[0.390] [0.489] [0.204] [0.074] [0.386]
HtV × GIM≥ 10 × ProxyPremium(21) 0.806∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 1.34
[0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.007] [0.110]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,177 3,177 3,177 3,177 3,177
R-squared 6.50% 6.50% 6.50% 6.60% 6.50%
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Table 11: PCA Regressions
Table 11 contains the principal components regressions. The dependent variable is the 5-day OLS market model cumulative abnormal
return. The title of each column indicates the valuation difficulty variable, whose coefficient is in the row ‘HtV’. Table 1 defines the
variables. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
software medical HighDispersion HighVariability HighError
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GIM≥ 10 -0.838∗∗∗ -0.743∗∗ -0.779∗∗ -0.959∗∗∗ -0.747∗∗
[0.002] [0.014] [0.017] [0.003] [0.013]
HtV -0.818∗∗∗ -1.460∗∗∗ -0.758 -1.091∗∗∗ -1.503
[0.008] [0.003] [0.111] [0.003] [0.138]
GIM≥ 10*HtV 2.148∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗ 0.918 1.491∗∗∗ 3.385∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.120] [0.005] [0.015]
BidderComp1 -0.009 -0.01 -0.033 -0.036 -0.014
[0.936] [0.919] [0.763] [0.743] [0.897]
BidderComp2 0.055 0.065 0.043 0.039 0.061
[0.706] [0.657] [0.763] [0.782] [0.670]
BidderComp3 -0.637∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AcqComp1 -0.629∗∗∗ -0.642∗∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗ -0.637∗∗∗ -0.645∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AcqComp2 -0.072 -0.078 -0.076 -0.069 -0.077
[0.495] [0.447] [0.479] [0.523] [0.469]
AcqComp3 0.091 0.086 0.081 0.09 0.077
[0.371] [0.377] [0.415] [0.369] [0.437]
AcqComp4 0.209∗ 0.205∗ 0.192∗ 0.200∗ 0.207∗∗
[0.056] [0.052] [0.074] [0.066] [0.049]
AcqComp5 0.202∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.177∗
[0.041] [0.049] [0.050] [0.035] [0.065]
AcqComp6 0.337∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
AcqComp7 -0.138 -0.14 -0.135 -0.148 -0.134
[0.137] [0.132] [0.146] [0.112] [0.143]
AcqComp8 -0.221∗∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.230∗∗ -0.225∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
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[0.012] [0.017] [0.011] [0.012] [0.009]
Constant 1.035∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005]
Observations 3,935 3,935 3,935 3,935 3,935
R-squared 4.90% 4.90% 4.80% 5.00% 4.90%
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Table 12:
Table 12 contains results from the two-step regression process that replaces the dictatorship dummy with the residual from a first stage
regression that predicts the level of ATPs. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
Software Medical HighDispersion HighVariability HighError
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Residual GIM -0.203∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.006] [0.007] [0.011] [0.005]
HardToVal -0.76 -0.707 0.242 0.367 1.098
[0.121] [0.261] [0.592] [0.291] [0.296]
Residual
GIM*HardToVal
0.349∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.092∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.770∗∗
[0.000] [0.005] [0.054] [0.032] [0.023]
lnta -0.409∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
tobinq 0.404∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
priv -0.086∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
fcf 11.846∗∗ 12.600∗∗ 12.636∗∗ 12.852∗∗ 12.133∗∗
[0.020] [0.015] [0.016] [0.017] [0.018]
leverage 4.743∗∗∗ 5.176∗∗∗ 5.081∗∗∗ 5.123∗∗∗ 5.034∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
bhar -0.497 -0.468 -0.45 -0.456 -0.445
[0.309] [0.348] [0.365] [0.347] [0.368]
indMA -3.192 -5.002 -5.689 -5.652 -5.429
[0.668] [0.484] [0.420] [0.426] [0.443]
relsize -2.490∗∗ -2.465∗∗ -2.470∗∗ -2.455∗∗ -2.436∗∗
[0.033] [0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038]
bothTech 0.755 0.654 0.726 0.729 0.685
[0.113] [0.132] [0.123] [0.104] [0.134]
bothTech*relsize -7.320∗ -7.912∗∗ -8.057∗∗ -8.058∗∗ -7.967∗∗
[0.061] [0.049] [0.041] [0.042] [0.045]
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conglomerate 0.101 0.092 0.111 0.092 0.125
[0.731] [0.757] [0.709] [0.759] [0.677]
pub*cash 0.597 0.558 0.549 0.559 0.543
[0.273] [0.300] [0.308] [0.294] [0.316]
pub*stock -2.088∗∗∗ -2.069∗∗∗ -2.061∗∗∗ -2.058∗∗∗ -2.065∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
priv*cash 0.118 0.109 0.122 0.115 0.133
[0.780] [0.797] [0.776] [0.786] [0.758]
priv*stock 0.204 0.171 0.178 0.196 0.178
[0.770] [0.802] [0.793] [0.771] [0.794]
sub*cash 1.510∗∗∗ 1.538∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗ 1.540∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
competed -1.202∗ -1.147∗ -1.161∗ -1.223∗ -1.109
[0.092] [0.094] [0.090] [0.069] [0.106]
vol 0.125 0.134 0.127 0.127 0.128
[0.295] [0.269] [0.291] [0.291] [0.283]
crossBorder 3.27 3.452 3.519 3.564 3.498
[0.386] [0.364] [0.354] [0.358] [0.360]
friendly -1.52 -1.417 -1.338 -1.427 -1.386
[0.113] [0.119] [0.135] [0.116] [0.131]
serial 0.368 0.333 0.343 0.337 0.338
[0.374] [0.405] [0.394] [0.394] [0.398]
Constant 3.438∗∗ 3.267∗∗ 3.120∗∗ 3.163∗∗ 3.138∗∗
[0.021] [0.019] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026]
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
R-squared 8.70% 8.50% 8.50% 8.50% 8.50%
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